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INTERACT - Researching Third Country Nationals’ Integration as a Three-way Process - 
Immigrants, Countries of Emigration and Countries of Immigration as Actors of Integration 
 
Around 25 million persons born in a third country (TCNs) are currently living in the 
European Union (EU), representing 5% of its total population. Integrating immigrants, i.e. 
allowing them to participate in the host society at the same level as natives, is an active, not a 
passive, process that involves two parties, the host society and the immigrants, working 
together to build a cohesive society. 
  
Policy-making on integration is commonly regarded as primarily a matter of concern for the 
receiving state, with general disregard for the role of the sending state. However, migrants 
belong to two places: first, where they come and second, where they now live. While 
integration takes place in the latter, migrants maintain a variety of links with the former. New 
means of communication facilitating contact between migrants and their homes, globalisation 
bringing greater cultural diversity to host countries, and nation-building in source countries 
seeing expatriate nationals as a strategic resource have all transformed the way migrants 
interact with their home country. 
  
INTERACT project looks at the ways governments and non-governmental institutions in 
origin countries, including the media, make transnational bonds a reality, and have developed 
tools that operate economically (to boost financial transfers and investments); culturally (to 
maintain or revive cultural heritage); politically (to expand the constituency); legally (to 
support their rights). 
  
INTERACT project explores several important questions: To what extent do policies pursued 
by EU member states to integrate immigrants, and policies pursued by governments and non-
state actors in origin countries regarding expatriates, complement or contradict each other?  
What effective contribution do they make to the successful integration of migrants and what 
obstacles do they put in their way? 
  
A considerable amount of high-quality research on the integration of migrants has been 
produced in the EU. Building on existing research to investigate the impact of origin countries 
on the integration of migrants in the host country remains to be done. 
  
INTERACT is co-financed by the European Union and is implemented by a consortium built 
by CEDEM, UPF and MPI Europe. 
 
For more information: 
INTERACT 
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (EUI) 
Convento 
Via delle Fontanelle 19 
50014 San Domenico di Fiesole 
Italy 
Tel: +39 055 46 85 817 
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This position paper addresses the following research question: “How do actors in sending countries 
influence the integration of immigrants in the European Union, with regard to the access to 
citizenship?” The paper argues that the access to citizenship can be viewed as an important factor in 
the process of integration of immigrants in the destination country. The role of actors in third 
countries, while only one of the factors that determine citizenship take-up among integration, is crucial 
as particularly by allowing dual citizenship, countries of origin can take away a major constraint for 
immigrants in the naturalisation process. Research shows that naturalisation rates are positively 
impacted by tolerant policies towards dual citizenship. The report discusses the state-of-the-art on the 
propensity to naturalise among immigrants, as well as on the relation between citizenship and 
integration. It also presents some key findings from the literature and outlines the relevant questions 
for further research. 
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1. Introduction to the field of research 
This position paper addresses the following research question: “How do actors in sending countries 
influence the integration of immigrants in the European Union, with regard to the access to 
citizenship?  
Three conceptual clarifications should be made from the start. First, an ‘immigrant’ is defined as a 
person born in a third country and residing in the European Union. While immigrants can be 
understood more generally as all foreign-born persons residing in a country, following the overall 
focus of the INTERACT project we restrict our discussion in this paper to immigrants from non-EU 
countries. Second, ‘integration’ as understood as the process by which immigrants become accepted 
into society, both as individuals and as groups (Penninx 2003). This definition thus views integration 
deliberately as a process, rather than as an endpoint and also is deliberately open as to what precisely 
determines the acceptance of immigrants in a society, which may –after all– vary from one receiving 
society to the other. Thirdly, ‘citizenship’ is a legal status and relation between an individual and a 
state that entails specific legal rights and duties. (EUDO CITIZENSHIP 2013a). In some countries, the 
status may be called ‘nationality’ rather than citizenship and the persons holding the status are referred 
to as nationals rather than citizens. In this paper, the terms citizenship and nationality are conceived as 
interchangeably, though for the sake of clarity we systematically use the first term only.  
Following these conceptual clarifications, the paper starts out on the basis of two assumptions with 
regard to the role of third countries with regard to immigrant integration and access to citizenship. 
While these two assumptions are not intended as undisputable starting points for the following 
discussion, they do indicate the theoretical scope within which this paper should be positioned. The 
first assumption is that the access to citizenship can be seen as indicator of integration, in the sense 
that it closes an important legal gap between immigrants and natives. However, although from the 
perspective of ‘becoming accepted into society’ acquiring destination country citizenship is likely an 
important step in the integration process, it is not seen as the endpoint of this process. Hence, in this 
report the access to citizenship is viewed as a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for full 
integration of immigrants in the destination country. The second assumption is that third countries 
cannot directly influence the acquisition of citizenship by immigrants in EU member states, which is 
after all a sovereign competence of the respective state (within the constraints set by international law, 
for example with regard to the avoidance of statelessness); however, particularly by allowing dual 
citizenship, countries of origin can take away a major constraint for immigrants in the naturalisation 
process. Hence, political actors in origin countries, such as legislators who determine the rules of dual 
citizenship as well as government officials linked to diplomatic representations who may reach out to 
the emigrant community, are expected to be able to play an important role in the process of integrating 
migrants in destination countries, in terms of stimulating (or not) the acquisition of citizenship. Their 
role, however, is necessarily one which should be understood in conjunction with the constellation of 
actors and rules in the destination country. 
When discussing the role of origin countries in relation to citizenship acquisition of migrants in 
destination countries, one enters unavoidably into a discussion on dual citizenship, understood as the 
possession by individual of two citizenship statuses. Dual citizenship is a fact of life in a mobile 
world. As a result of international migration, rearrangements of the territorial scope of states and the 
lack of a global coordination between citizenship laws, millions of people worldwide are citizens of 
two, or more, states (Faist 2009; Faist and Kivisto 2007).1
                                                     
1 In this paper we use the term ‘dual citizenship’, but it is possible that individuals possess more than two citizenship statuses, 
in which case the term ‘multiple citizenship’ would be more appropriate. 
 In Europe, where increasing gender equality 
provides both the father and the mother the opportunity to transmit their citizenship to their offspring, 
children often automatically become dual citizens at birth when their parents are citizens of different 
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states. They often also acquire two citizenships when they are born in another country than their 
parents and their country of birth has a regime of territorial birthright (Vink and De Groot 2010). 
Many people moreover acquire an additional citizenship at a later stage of life because they take up 
residence in another country than where they born and wish to consolidate their position in that new 
society through acquiring the citizenship of their country of residence.  
Despite its ascendency as a demographic phenomenon, dual citizenship is still seen by many as a 
problematic phenomenon that should be avoided if possible. In line with a traditionally restrictive 
approach to dual citizenship in international law, a substantial number of states in Europe and beyond 
actively discourage multiple citizenship, by requiring candidates for naturalisation to renounce their 
previous citizenship prior to naturalisation or by having provisions that lead to the automatic loss of 
citizenship when their citizens voluntarily acquire another citizenship (Vonk 2012; Vink and De Groot 
2010). However, the worldwide number of states with a restrictive approach to dual citizenship has 
been decreasing for the past few decades and migrants are thus increasingly less often compelled to 
make a decision regarding their choice of citizenship (United Nations 2013: 113).  
From a destination country perspective, naturalisation is increasingly seen as an important part of the 
process of integrating immigrants and in order to optimise the use of what is sometimes termed the 
‘citizenship premium’, actors in destination countries increasingly often advocate public policies that are 
aimed at increasing naturalisation rates among immigrants (OECD 2011; Sumption and Flamm 2012). 
The acquisition of citizenship is associated with better employment probability, higher earnings and 
higher occupational positions (Liebig and von Haaren, 2011). Politically, citizenship of course usually 
qualifies immigrants to take an active part in the electoral politics of the destination country, but research 
also shows that it increases non-electoral political participation, although with substantial variation 
among immigrant groups (Prokic-Breuer, Vink, Hutcheson and Jeffers, 2013; cf. Pikkov 2011).  
In the remainder of the paper, we first discuss the main methodological approaches in researching 
integration in this field of research, with particular attention to the influence of the countries and 
societies of origin. Subsequently, we outline the actors involved and identify the diverging and 
converging interests of the sending and receiving countries, as well as the strategies of the sending 
societies to push their interests. The paper will then outline the theoretical framework and 
subsequently illustrate the framework with case studies concerning the relationships between the 
countries of origin and their impact on migrant communities abroad.  
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2. Methodology used in research in the field  
The question of immigrant naturalisation is not a new question in the migration literature. A well-
developed body of research looks at the determinants of naturalisation, mostly but not exclusively in 
the North American context (North, 1987; Portes and Curtis, 1987; Yang, 1994; Jones-Correa, 2001; 
Chiswick and Miller, 2008; DeVoretz and Pivnenko, 2004; Bloemraad, 2002; Rallu, 2011; Liebig and 
Von Haaren, 2011).2
While these studies have contributed to our understanding of the determination of citizenship take-
up among immigrants, their comparative scope is surprisingly limited, from the perspective of 
migration destination countries. Most studies focus on the North American context, with key 
contributions looking in particular at the case of the US (Yang, 1994; Jones-Correa, 2001; Chiswick 
and Miller, 2008; see also DeVoretz and Pivnenko, 2004 on Canada). Some notable exceptions exist, 
though at best they compare a few countries. In the context of the ‘naturalisation gap’ between Canada 
and the US, for example, important work draws attention to the extent to which naturalisation is 
institutionally encouraged (Bloemraad, 2002; Picot and Hou 2011). Other studies have investigated the 
relevance of the citizenship legislation in countries of origin, in particular in relation to toleration of 
dual citizenship (Jones-Correa, 2001). These examples, however, are exceptions confirming the rule, 
as we are still a long way off from understanding the relationship between country of origin features, 
individual characteristics and the institutional opportunity structure in which naturalisation takes place. 
 Typically, these studies look at a range of individual characteristics, such as 
educational attainment, age at migration, years of residence, family situation and, relating to country 
of origin, economic development, the political situation and toleration of dual citizenship (for a recent 
comprehensive overview and analysis, see Chiswick and Miller, 2008). 
In particular, in Europe, where citizenship policies differ substantially (Vink and De Groot, 2010), 
we see large differences in citizenship take-up rates, with around 80 percent of the foreign-born 
population naturalised after at least ten years residence in the Netherlands and Sweden, around 65 
percent of a comparable group in the UK, 50 percent in France and only around 35 percent in 
Germany and Switzerland (Liebig and Von Haaren, 2011: 28). The logical question is thus: are these 
differences in citizenship take-up rates explained by differences in the demographic composition of 
the immigrant population, or rather by the institutional structure made up of citizenship policies in the 
countries of origin and destination? We cannot answer this important policy-relevant question without 
an explicit cross-national comparison. Hence, as both the composition of immigrant populations and 
citizenship policies across Europe vary significantly, studies which take the idea of a ‘citizenship 
constellation’ (Bauböck 2010) seriously, should include a comparative design captures, in addition to 
the individual characteristics of migrants and aspects of the opportunity structures in destination 
countries, also the features of rules and practices in origin countries. While advanced methodological 
techniques, such as cross-classified multi-level anaysis (Van Tubergen et 2004) allow capturing such 
complexities, their application in the field of citizenship studies so far is still the exception, rather than 
the rule (see e.g. Dronkers and Vink 2012; Vink, Prokic-Breuer and Dronkers 2013). 
In terms of the question of the ‘citizenship premium’, much of the recent literature has focused on 
the question whether citizenship acquisition actually improves labour market performance or whether 
immigrants who perform better on the labour market are more likely to naturalise.3
                                                     
2 The first three paragraphs of this section draw on Vink, Prokic-Breuer and Dronkers (2013). 
 In other words, is 
there unobserved heterogeneity, for example related to ability or motivation of immigrants, which is 
driving the association between naturalisation and economic performance? This causality question is 
clearly of key importance and scholars have developed specific methodological strategies depending 
on the type of available data, such as using instrumental variables (Bevelander and Pendakur 2012; 
3 This paragraph draws on Prokic-Breuer, Dronkers and Vink (2013). 
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Rallu 2011) or a Heckman two-stage model (DeVoretz and Pivnenko 2005) for cross-sectional 
datasets, or individual fixed effects and longitudinal analysis with panel data (Bratsberg et al 2002; 
Steinhardt 2012). The common denominator of these studies with a more refined analysis of the 
relation between naturalisation and economic performance is that when controlling for self-selection 
the citizenship premium decreases, but –crucially– remains significant (see Scott 2008, for a 
contrasting view). 
While most studies of the relation between naturalisation and integration, have focused on policies 
and structural context of destination countries, particularly in Europe there is relatively little attention 
for the role of origin countries in the process of naturalisation and integration of immigrants. Yet it is 
evident that the ‘origin factor’ matters significantly when assessing the question of immigrant 
integration. Especially, dual citizenship policies in origin countries should be taken into account as a 
potential facilitating or restraining factor for the process of integration of immigrants. These dual 
citizenship policies may be reflected in general rules in constitutions or citizenship laws on the loss of 
citizenship upon voluntary acquisition of another citizenship (see below), but also in more specific 
bilateral agreements between countries or rules that only apply to citizens from certain countries (see 
for example the German exception for EU citizens).  
In Europe, as elsewhere, we see that many traditional emigrant countries initially develop a 
restrictive attitude towards the acquisition of foreign citizenship by the emigrant community, yet later 
often develop a more tolerant approach. A sending states as Mexico originally have sought to exercise 
control over the diaspora by penalising the acquisition of foreign citizenship with the loss of the 
citizenship of origin, yet now recognize that ‘mexicanidad’ can be maintained while acquiring, for 
example, US citizenship (Fitzgerald 2009: 33). Also in Europe we see an unmistakable trend that 
states increasingly start to reconceptualize citizenship in a more transnational manner (Vink and De 
Groot 2010). This affects both European receiving countries, such as Germany, France and Italy, as 
European sending countries, such as Armenia or Ukraine. In post-Soviet Armenia, for example, the 
approach to dual citizenship was originally largely restrictive, as a result of concerns that the 
Armenian naturalised abroad would be able to avoid military service at the time of the conflict over 
the Nagorno-Karabakh territory. In a more general sense, due to the sizeable diaspora, there have been 
strong concerns about the interference in Armenian politics and society of foreign citizens, in the case 
of Armenians who have acquired another citizenship (Makaryan 2013: 6). However, since 2007, dual 
citizenship has been fully accepted and acquiring the citizenship of another state no longer implies the 
automatic loss of Armenian citizenship (Makaryan 2013: 15).  
Moreover, in addition to these formal rules, what matters equally –and has been relatively 
underresearched so far– is how e.g. governmental actors in origin countries in practice stimulate or 
discourage the acquisition of a foreign citizenship by the emigrant community. For example, in Ukraine, 
there is an overall negative attitude towards dual citizenship, as a result of concerns about the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine vis-à-vis Russia (Shevel 2010: 1). However, more 
recently the attitude against dual citizenship has softened and in practice allows many Ukrainian citizens 
who acquire a foreign citizenship to retain their citizenship of origin (Shevel 2010: 11). A similar trend 
can be observed in Georgia, where in 2004 a special ‘dual citizenship commission’ was formed to create 
a more liberal framework for dual citizenship, in response to demand from the sizeable Georgian 
diaspora (Gugushvili 2012: 9). However, in Georgia, as in Ukraine, the legal framework remains unclear 
as to the extent to which dual citizenship has been embraced or not and, at times, seems to be applied in a 
problematic manner in cases of political controversy (Gugushvili 2012: 23). 
There are two reasons for why dual citizenship policies in origin countries should be taken into 
account, from the perspective of the integration of immigrants in destination countries. First, being 
able to retain the citizenship of origin generally can be expected to increase naturalisation rates among 
immigrant groups. Jones-Correa (2001), for example, demonstrates that changes in citizenship policies 
in Latin American countries in the 1990s had a positive effect on naturalisation rates among 
immigrants groups in the US from countries that recently allowed dual citizenship. Vink et al (2013) 
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demonstrate that in 15 European countries the possibility of retaining the citizenship of origin, 
depending on citizenship law in destination and origin countries, positive correlates with the 
propensity to naturalise. In Portugal, for example, low naturalisation rates among the Ukrainian 
community are mainly attributed to the risk of losing Ukrainian citizenship (EUDO CITIZENSHIP 
2013b: 13). This indicates that, in as far as there has been a softening of the negative attitude towards 
dual citizenship in Ukraine (see above), this has not yet translated into a proactive policy, for example 
through the diplomatic representation in Portugal, to encourage the naturalisation of Ukrainians in 
Portugal (but see eg ACIDI 2011). Mazzolari (2009: 187) also links the increased propensity to 
naturalise to improve integration outcomes: ‘Immigrants coming from countries that have recently 
allowed dual citizenship are found not only to be more likely to naturalise but also to experience 
relative employment and earnings gains and to lower their reliance on welfare.’ This relates to the 
benefits of naturalisation, such as increased employability, as discussed below. 
Second, there is the question of how retaining the citizenship of origin influences the integration 
process. While there is some limited work on the relation between dual citizenship and sociocultural 
integration and political participation (e.g. eg. Staton et al 2007; Dagevos 2008; Ersanilli and 
Koopmans 2010), there is a much more limited literature on the relation between dual citizenship 
status and socioeconomic integration. As a result, few studies on the relation between naturalisation 
and economic integration, or other integration indicators, employ explicit methodologies that allow for 
the identification of the influence of the origin countries. As argued by Prokic-Breuer, Dronkers and 
Vink (2013), the literature on citizenship and integration has developed methodologies mainly aimed 
at detecting whether destination country citizenship matters, which may not necessarily be suited to 
analysing the question to whom citizenship matters.  
3. Discussion of the literature: focus on the role of the country of origin4
This section outlines the actors involved in the process of immigrant integration in destination 
countries and identify the diverging and converging interests of the sending and receiving countries, as 
well as the strategies of the sending societies to push their interests. We start by discussing the relation 
between citizenship and integration and then go into the question to what extent and how actors from 
origin countries can encourage the access to citizenship of migrants in destination countries. 
 
The relation between naturalisation and the structural integration of immigrants (i.e. their inclusion 
into existing social structures, such as the labour market) has received increasing scholarly attention 
since Chiswick’s (1978) seminal study of the effects of citizenship acquisition on earnings of foreign-
born men in the US. While the literature is marred by differentiated findings, depending on choice of 
destination country, immigrant group, dependent variable (e.g. employment status or income) and 
methodological design (e.g. based on cross-sectional or longitudinal data), it is fair to say that the 
consensus is that overall naturalisation has a strong potential to improve the economic well-being of 
an immigrant (see e.g. Bratsberg et al, 2002; DeVoretz and Pivnenko 2005; Mazzolari 2009; OECD 
2011; Rallu 2011; Bevelander and Pendakur 2012; Steinhardt 2012).  
In as far as a ‘citizenship premium’ is observed in the literature, the main reasons are seen as 
threefold: a) unrestricted access to the labour market: in many countries citizenship is still a 
requirement for certain jobs, particularly in the public sector; b) better employability: the absence of 
administrative costs associated with work and residence permits makes it easier to hire naturalised 
immigrants; and c) citizenship acquisition as a signalling device of integration: naturalisation indicates 
a clear commitment of the immigrant to remain in the country of residence, hence lowering the 
uncertainty of the employer, and formal equality also decreases (though does not prevent) the risk of 
discrimination. On the whole, naturalised immigrants thus are generally seen as more likely to have 
                                                     
4 This section draws on Vink and Schmeets (2013). 
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paid employment and less likely to be unemployed, as well as more likely to have higher earnings due 
to better occupational status (Liebig and von Haaren, 2011).  
When we look more specifically at the literature on the relation between dual citizenship status and 
immigrants integration, what strikes is that the relevance of retaining origin country citizenship is 
framed virtually exclusively as a naturalisation effect: ‘Immigrants coming from countries that have 
recently allowed dual citizenship are found not only to be more likely to naturalise but also to 
experience relative employment and earnings gains and to lower their reliance on welfare’ (Mazzolari 
2009: 187). In other words, Mazzolari compares those naturalised immigrants with non-naturalised 
immigrants, but does not compare naturalised immigrants with dual citizenship with naturalised 
immigrants without dual citizenship (cf. Liebig and Von Haaren 2011: 30). One important reason for 
this limited analysis of dual citizenship is data availability: while national registration data and 
international surveys (such as the European Social Survey and the Labour Force Survey) include 
valuable information on destination country citizenship, they seldomly include data on retention of 
origin country citizenship. 
The key ‘citizenship’ question is thus often seen as whether an immigrant has destination country 
citizenship or not (see e.g. OECD 2011), whereas keeping the origin citizenship is seen as relevant 
only in terms of the extent to which it influences the propensity to naturalise. There is some limited 
work, though with rather mixed findings, on the relation between dual citizenship and sociocultural 
integration and political participation (e.g. Staton et al 2007; Dagevos 2008; Ersanilli and Koopmans 
2010). Yet overall, the literature on the ‘citizenship premium’ treats dual citizenship as largely 
irrelevant from the perspective of affecting the potential pay-off of naturalisation, in terms of 
improving integration outcomes.  
In other words, the default assumption seems to be that what matters for the integration of an 
immigrant is destination country citizenship, not origin country citizenship and in as far as the latter is 
relevant, it is because of the relevance for the propensity to naturalise. However, to what extent this 
assumption is empirically valid, is a largely unresearched question. While this is a question that often 
arises in political debates on dual citizenship (see e.g. Schmeets and Vink 2011, on the Netherlands), 
in academic studies the question has been mainly left unaddressed. From the perspective of this brief 
literature review, the main identifiable gap in the literature thus relates to the under-researched issue 
of the relevance of retaining origin country citizenship for the relation between naturalisation and 
immigrant integration.  
In the next section we discuss two sides to this under-researched question: first, the question to 
what extent dual citizenship policies in origin countries affect the propensity to naturalise, for migrants 
in destination countries; and, second, the question to what extent the ‘citizenship premium’ is affected 
by an increased propensity to naturalise for immigrants from origin countries that allow dual 
citizenship.  
4. Proposed theoretical framework 
Citizenship is a legal status and expresses a relationship between an individual and a state that entails 
specific legal rights and duties. As for the rights attached to citizenship, the most important right 
associated with citizenship is the protection by the state and unrestricted access to the territory. Even if 
alternative permanent residence statuses, such as the green card in the US, may provide sufficient 
security of residence and strong protection against expulsion, ‘naturalisation’ ultimately transforms a 
foreigner into a citizen. Citizenship provides additional privileges, such as diplomatic protection, the 
right to vote, and access to public sector jobs, to name a few.  
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Citizenship of origin and the naturalisation propensity5
Citizenship laws vary greatly between countries and thus may well explain differences in terms of 
naturalisation rates between similar immigrant groups. Typically, we see important differences 
between immigration countries, such as Canada and the United States, and most European countries. 
In the North American context, birth in the territory gives automatic access to citizenship to the second 
generation and naturalisation is seen as a natural part of the integration process that follows 
immigration. In most European countries, by contrast, citizenship acquisition has for a long time been 
dominated by descent-based transmission from one generation to the next and therefore was never 
very accessible to immigrants. However, within Europe we see a large variety of policies that regulate 
access to citizenship and some countries, notably Ireland, the United Kingdom and France, have 
stronger ius soli traditions, which is partly still reflected in citizenship policies of today (see for 
example, Baubock et al., 2006; Brubaker, 1992; Janoski, 2010; Vink and De Groot, 2010; Weil, 2002).  
 
Aspects of citizenship laws that influence the ‘ accessibility’ of citizenship for immigrants are the 
conditions for ordinary naturalisation, such as residence requirements, dual citizenship toleration, 
language and integration requirements, fees, and administrative discretion. For children of immigrants 
and subsequent generations, ius soli birthright also matters greatly as this determines whether they are 
included at birth as full members of the political community.  
Although the acquisition of citizenship can offer significant benefits, we know that some immigrants 
naturalise and other do not. Why is that? Yang (1994: 457) argues that immigrants’ perceptions of the 
costs, benefits and meaning of naturalisation are conditioned principally by the socio-economic situation 
in their countries of origin: insecurity, poor economic conditions and low standards of living may deter 
immigrants from desiring to return to their homelands. In other words, citizenship provides security, but 
the utility of naturalisation is appreciated differently among immigrant groups, depending on their 
country of origin context (Jasso and Rosenzweig, 1986: 303; Bueker, 2005; Logan et al, 2012). Based on 
this reasoning, one would expect, certainly in developed European countries (as in North America), that 
the citizenship take-up rate is higher among immigrants from less developed or lower-income countries. 
The context of country of origin is thus, first and foremost, relevant in terms of motivating the demand 
for naturalisation from an immigrant’s perspective. 
Based on the literature, one would assume that differences will still exist among immigrants in their 
perceptions of the chances of life improvement secured by citizenship, even within groups coming from 
countries of origin with relatively similar levels of development. If seen as a life-course event (Tucci, 
2011), citizenship take-up is likely to be influenced by expectations and ambitions related to an 
individual’s life situation. For example, we expect that residence matters: the longer an immigrant 
resides in a country, the higher the expectation of legal incorporation in the host country community. 
Existing research has shown this to be one of the best individual-level predictors of naturalisation (e.g. 
Bueker 2006: 132; Dronkers and Vink 2012: 404). Additionally, immigrants who are married and those 
who have children may also be more strongly motivated to acquire citizenship, as fulfillment either of 
their own life-course project, or that of their spouse and/or children (who may be left behind in the 
country of origin). Another important individual characteristic which can be assumed to positively affect 
the ability to qualify for citizenship is language competence. Jasso and Rosenzweig (1986: 305) observe 
that, for the USA, ‘coming from a country in which English is an official language facilitates 
naturalisation, for which knowledge of the English language is a requirement.’ Yang (1994: 468) 
confirms these findings and factors such years of residence, being married and having children, as well 
as speaking the language of the host country would be expected to be included in most micro-level 
investigations (e.g. Yang, 1994; Chiswick and Miller, 2008; Dronkers and Vink, 2012).  
 
                                                     
5 This section draws on Vink, Prokic-Breuer and Dronkers (2013). 
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Crucial determinants, in line with the literature, are socioeconomic factors such as human capital 
(educational attainment, occupational status) and employment status. There are two key reasons why 
one would expect that higher levels of human capital would increase the propensity to naturalise 
(Yang, 1994). First, as to human capital, as better-educated or more highly skilled persons are more 
likely to qualify for the type of public sector jobs for which citizenship may be a precondition, they are 
more likely to capitalize on this citizenship bonus and thus to invest in the naturalisation process. The 
same goes for employment: only those immigrants active on the labor market are likely to expect a 
return on their investment in the naturalisation process, for example in terms of wage increase. The 
second reason is related to the selectivity of the naturalisation process, which may deter immigrants 
who decide not to bother investing in a procedure that looks very complex and is difficult to 
understand. Less educated or skilled immigrants may be deterred more easily by the seeming 
complexity of the naturalisation process. Hence, following both arguments, one would expect that 
immigrants with higher levels of human capital and employed immigrants are more likely to acquire 
the destination country citizenship. It is often hypothesised that ‘social capital’ also matters, for 
example in terms of immigrant networks and access to information on naturalisation procedures, but 
the evidence there is less systematic. 
However, whereas most single-destination country studies have stopped here, logically looking 
only at the variation in the origin country citizenship policies of the immigrant population, particularly 
in a European context citizenship policy in the destination context is crucial. Citizenship policies set 
the conditions under which immigrants can naturalise, for example the required years of residence, the 
requirement to renounce one’s previous citizenship, language and civic integration tests and fees. In 
Europe, we see large differences in terms of residence requirements, varying from three to twelve or 
more years (until 1999 even fifteen years in Germany) as well as fees, ranging from no costs 
whatsoever to nearly two thousand euro in Austria (Goodman 2010). Eligibility criteria such as 
residence requirements make the acquisition of citizenship a rather more or less realistic prospect 
within a foreseeable future. We expect that immigrants are more likely to acquire destination country 
citizenship in countries with a citizenship law that makes citizenship relatively accessible.  
Aside from individual characteristics and legal requirements in the destination country, the legal 
framework set by the citizenship laws in the countries of origin and destination provides the 
opportunity structure with regard to access to citizenship. In the literature, most research has gone out 
to citizenship policy in the origin country, particularly with regard to the possibility of retaining one’s 
previous citizenship when acquiring a new citizenship. Whether citizenship can be retained will 
depend on the combined outcome of the citizenship legislation in both the countries of origin and 
destination. In order to avoid conflicting allegiance or loyalties, many countries have a rule that 
implies the loss of the citizenship of origin upon the voluntary acquisition of another. Some countries 
also require immigrants to renounce their citizenship of origin, if they do not lose it automatically. In 
Europe, countries such as Austria, Denmark and Norway have a strict renunciation requirement (Vink 
and De Groot 2011). This leads to the expectation that immigrants who can retain their citizenship of 
origin are more likely to acquire destination country citizenship. It should be noted, however, that the 
findings in the literature on this point are rather ambiguous as some studies which hypothesize a 
positive effect of dual citizenship toleration in the origin country, find in fact the opposite (see Jones-
Correa 2001; Mazzolari, 2009; but compare Yang, 1994; Dronkers and Vink 2012; Logan et al, 2012). 
Such contradicatory findings are likely related to the differences in methodological design, for 
example with regard to sample size and definition of immigrant population (e.g. whether or not to 
include the second generation). 
Third, with regard to dual citizenship policies, while the option to retain dual citizenship may be 
expected in general to affect the decision on whether to naturalise, one may assume that the absence of 
the dual citizenship option in particular affects immigrants from highly developed countries. After all, 
not only are immigrants from less developed countries in general more motivated to naturalise, thus 
more willing to accept the potential cost of breaking off the legal link with the country of birth, but 
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those from more developed countries also have more to lose, so to say, in terms of the value of 
citizenship. It would thus be intuitive to expect a stronger positive relation between dual citizenship 
tolerance and naturalisation among immigrants from highly developed countries. 
Citizenship of origin and the naturalisation premium6
Economic studies have shown that citizenship matters in particular for the employability of 
immigrants and their incomes. Naturalisation increases employability as employers take into account 
the administrative costs of hiring foreigners and verifying rights to work (Bevelander and DeVoretz, 
2008; Bratsberg et al, 2002). Naturalisation can also be a ‘signalling device’ to employers about the 
better integration of potential workers, as citizenship is often associated with better language mastery 
(Liebig and Von Haaren, 2011: 17). Finally, while foreigners may even have the right to participate in 
political elections, at local or regional level, suffrage in national elections remains largely exclusive to 
citizens, with a few exceptions (notably Brazilians in Portugal and Irish and Commonwealth citizens 
citizens in the UK, as well as British citizens in Ireland). 
 
In effect, the mainstream literature on naturalisation and economic integration assumes what might 
be termed an ‘assimilationist’ perspective on dual citizenship and naturalisation. Classically, 
assimilation is seen as a process by which immigrant groups fully integrate themselves into a new 
country, ranging from cultural assimilation to structural assimilation (Gordon 1964). Since the move 
to obtain citizenship indicates a commitment to stay in the destination country and requires a 
minimum of acculturation, this may be seen as an indicator of assimilation (White, Biddlecom and 
Guo 1993: 99). From this assimilation perspective, the acquisition of citizenship of the destination 
country is thus an important step on the way to the civic and structural assimilation into the institutions 
of the host society. While naturalisation may not fully overcome the disadvantageous situation 
immigrants often find themselves in, caused by racial discrimination, language difficulties or cultural 
habits which set off immigrants against the native population, it is deemed to narrow the employment 
gap between immigrants and natives by making the first similar to the latter in terms of legal status.  
There are at least two opposing views to such a narrow perspective which only considers the 
relation between citizenship and integration from a destination country perspective. These views 
should be seen as proto-theories, at best, rather than well-established theories which can provide a 
ready-make framework for a systematic analysis. We outline these contrasting views in this section 
and come back to them in the concluding remarks of the report. 
For a first alternative view we look at segmented assimilationist theory. This theory was originally 
developed to understand the different patterns of adaptation that emerge among second generation 
immigrants and argues that ‘joining those native circles to which they do have access may prove a 
ticket to permanent subordination and disadvantage’ (Portes and Zhou 1993: 96). The idea behind this 
is that when immigrants and their children ‘enter the bottom of the ethnic hierarchy of drastic social 
inequality, the forces of assimilation come mainly from the underprivileged segments of this structure, 
and this is likely to result in distinct disadvantages, viewed as maladjustment by both mainstream 
society and the ethnic community’ (Zhou 1997: 999).  
When we connect this to the debate on citizenship and integration, segmented assimilation theory 
thus points at the fact that the integrative (assimilationist) potential of naturalisation may be 
undermined by persisting disadvantegous group ties. While the most detrimental factors for limited 
assimilation are usually seen in racial stratification, spatial seggregation and cultural patterns of social 
relations, with regard to dual citizenship one might argue that it signals the ambiguous status of the 
immigrant of being caught between the contexts of the ethnic group and the destination country. 
Hence, from this perspective, we would expect that the presumed labour market benefits of 
                                                     
6 This section draws on Vink and Schmeets (2013). 
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assimilation through naturalisation are negatively conditioned by maintaining formal links with the 
origin country. The main reason for this is that dual citizenship signals hesitation towards full 
assimilation on the part of the immigrant and thus a stronger disposition to hold on to their ethnic 
context. In other words, from a segmented assimilationist view, we expect the citizenship premium to 
be higher for those immigrants who naturalise while renouncing their citizenship of origin. 
Alternatively, a transnationalist perspective endorses the idea that multiple forms of membership 
are a reality in a mobile world (e.g. Spiro 2007). As Portes (1999: 472) observes: “Instead of being a 
denationalizing force conspiring against the integrity of the host society, transnational activities can 
actually facilitate successful adaptation by providing opportunities for economic mobility and for a 
vital and purposeful group life.” From this perspective, the continued link to the country of origin, 
through dual citizenship, strengthens an immigrant’s social capital and thus not only does not 
preclude, but even strengthen the integration into the country of residence.  
5. Case studies on dual citizenship 
Case study I: assessing the impact of (dual) citizenship policies on immigrant naturalisation 
rates 
This section summarizes the results of a recent comparative study by Vink, Prokic-Breuer and 
Dronkers (2013) on the effects of citizenship policies in European countries on the propensity to 
naturalise, taking into account not only characteristics of individuals, but also their origin country 
features. In particular, the study looks at the relevance of destination country policies in the context of 
origin country features, such as the level of development of the origin country, as well as dual 
citizenship policies. The study is based on a sample of 7.489 foreign-born residents in 16 European 
countries, collected by the European Social Survey. The study is innovative because, in as far as any 
comparative research has been done on the effects of destination country policies, these have 
concluded that indeed ‘policy matters’ (Bloemraad 2002; Reichel 2011; Dronkers and Vink 2012). 
However, so far no research has been done on the question to whom citizenship policy matters more. 
Later in this section, we also introduce data from a new ‘global dual citizenship database’ (Vink, De 
Groot and Chun 2013), which collects information on dual citizenship policies in all countries of the 
world, since 1960.  
Vink, Prokic-Breuer and Dronkers (2013) hypothesise that the inclusiveness of citizenship policy 
matters in particular to those immigrants who are strongly motivated to naturalise, primarily those 
immigrants coming from less developed countries. After all, whereas the first group has a ‘valuable’ 
citizenship to fall back on and will thus continue to have a viable return option, the latter is likely to 
see citizenship acquisition as part of a life course project aimed at permanent settlement in a new 
country. While this need not necessarily rule out the idea of return to the home country, acquiring 
citizenship of the destination country is likely to be perceived as a key precondition for such return to 
the origin country, given that citizenship guarantees continuous mobility. Hence, these immigrants 
will be affected more significantly by policies which make destination country citizenship either not 
accessible within a reasonable period after arrival in the country due to prohibitive residency 
requirements or difficult or even impossible to acquire due to prohibitive and discretionary 
assimilation requirements.  
Vink, Prokic-Breuer and Dronkers (2013) find that the level of development of the country of 
origin is a crucial factor in understanding the relationships between on the one hand citizenship 
policies and on the other individual-level features and citizenship take-up rates in Europe. To arrive at 
this conclusion, the analysis first shows that demand for citizenship is influenced primarily by where 
immigrants are from. The level of human development of countries of origin accounts for the vast 
difference among immigrants in their propensity to naturalise. Immigrants in Europe coming from 
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medium and under-developed countries are on average 2.5 times more likely to have citizenship than 
those originating from highly developed countries, including EU member states and other OECD 
countries (Figure 1). These findings are in line with the literature and can be understood in terms of 
the perceived payoff attached to citizenship. Acquiring destination-country citizenship has a much 
higher potential pay-off for immigrants originating from low-income countries than for those coming 
from developed and more prosperous societies. In this context, securing residence status in a country 
which offers a vast increase in security and life chances, is of crucial importance.  
Figure 1. Probability of having destination country citizenship by level of development of origin 
country 
 
Source: Vink, Prokic-Breuer and Dronkers (2013). 
Crucially, because large differences exist between immigrants in their motivation to naturalise, 
Vink, Prokic-Breuer and Dronkers (2013) show that the impact of citizenship policies varies for these 
two groups. The legal framework set by the citizenship laws in the countries of origin and destination 
accounts for a difference in naturalisation rates, yet only for immigrants from less developed countries. 
In fact, not only are these immigrants twice as likely to naturalise in countries with very open 
citizenship policies, but they are also the ones particularly affected by these policies. Vink et al (2013) 
demonstrate the relevance of policy by introducing an indicator that captures the openness of 
citizenship policy in the destination countries for first generation immigrants, with regard to residency 
and integration requirements for naturalization (MIPEX Access to Nationality). They observe that an 
increase of 1 unit on the MIPEX scale leads to a 2.4 percent increase in the likelihood of having 
destination country citizenship. This finding is illustrated by Figures 2a and 2b, which portray these 
differences against the time dimension, length of residence, for immigrants from less developed 
countries (Figure 2a) and those from highly developed countries (Figure 2b). The steepness of all three 
lines indicates the degree to which policy matters for three groups of immigrants: i) those that have 
resided in the country between six and ten years; ii) those that have resided between 10 and 20 years; 
and iii) those that have resided more than 20 years. Only in the case of immigrants from under-
developed countries do we observe a sharp increase for all three groups in the citizenship take-up 
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rates. For immigrants from highly developed countries the positive relation between citizenship policy 
and naturalization rates is weaker, as indicated by the steepness of the lines.  
Figures 2a and 2b. Predicted probability of having destination country citizenship by MIPEX 
Access to Nationality (by years of residence in destination country) 
  
Source: Vink, Prokic-Breuer and Dronkers (2013). 
Second, the analysis by Vink, Prokic-Breuer and Dronkers (2013) shows that this origin factor is 
also related to the role of individual characteristics in immigrants’ decisions to naturalise. 
Differentiated analyses of citizenship take-up among two immigrant groups, from highly developed 
(incl. the EU) and from medium/under-developed countries, show that different determinants play a 
role for different groups. Socio-economic features such as human capital (e.g. language skills) and 
employment status indeed play significant roles in the take-up of citizenship, but only for immigrants 
from less developed countries. Historical and cultural ties between the origin country and the 
destination country also matter, for example in the context of former colonies. 
Case study II: charting dual citizenship policies worldwide in the last 50 years 
The relevance of dual citizenship thus needs to be understood in this context of differentiated 
naturalisation dynamics. In Europe, migration-receiving countries are increasingly unlikely to demand 
the renunciation of previous citizenship as a condition for naturalisation (Vink and De Groot 2011; 
updated in Vink and De Groot, forthcoming). This has to do with the fact that, in a world of migration 
where children of mixed-nationality couples increasingly often have dual citizenship at birth, it makes 
increasingly less sense to require from a specific group of immigrants that they renounce their 
citizenship of origin, when they naturalise. By 2010, of all EU member states, Austria, the Czech 
Republic, Denmark and Estonia are the only countries which still have an uncompromised 
renunciation demand in their citizenship legislation. Since the early 1990s, countries such as Italy, 
Finland, Luxembourg and Sweden abolished the renunciation demand altogether. Other countries, 
such as the Netherlands, currently allow for so many exceptions to the general rule that most 
naturalised citizens do not have to renounce their previous citizenship (De Groot and Vink 2008; Van 
Oers et al. 2006: 419). The new German naturalisation regime is also significantly more tolerant 
towards double citizenship than was previously the case, though still generally restrictive with regard 
to dual citizenship of specific categories of immigrants, as well as for the children of immigrants who 
can acquire German citizenship at birth but still have to make a decision between German and foreign 
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citizenship between the age of 18 and 23 (Hailbronner 2006b: 232). Spain formally has a renunciation 
demand but does not enforce it (Chopin 2006: 251). 
The attitudes towards dual citizenship of emigrants are perhaps most clearly manifested by the 
rules that exist in states with regard to the loss of citizenship after a citizen voluntary acquires the 
citizenship of another state. Basically, countries can be divided in three categories, depending on the 
type of general rule they apply (though, admittedly, bilateral agreements between countries may 
provide different rules for specific groups). Traditionally, in many states dual citizenship was 
perceived negatively and such states provide accordingly in their national legislation that citizenship is 
lost automatically upon the voluntary acquisition of another citizenship. By contrast, in states where 
dual citizenship is not perceived to be problematic, no such rules on loss of citizenship exist though 
citizens are allowed to voluntarily renounce their citizenship. Thirdly, in a minority of states, 
citizenship is not automatically lost and renunciation is also not possible. 
Figure 3. Worldwide rules on loss of citizenship after voluntary acquisition of other citizenship: 


































Source: Vink, De Groot and Luk (2013) 
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Figure 4. Worldwide rules on loss of citizenship after voluntary acquisition of other citizenship: 





























Source: Vink, De Groot and Luk (2013) 
Vink, De Groot and Luk (2013) have charted these rules for all countries in the world, from 1960 to 
2013, which provides a unique overview of the development of origin country citizenship policies 
over the last half century. As Figure 3 highlights, in 1960 the majority of countries the voluntary 
citizenship of another country implied the automatic loss of the citizenship of origin.7
                                                     
7 It should be kept in mind, when comparing Figure 3 and Figure 4, that the number of independent countries in the world 
was much smaller in 1960 than in 2013. There are also a number of countries on which the authors did not manage to 
find sufficiently reliable information on the applicable rule in 1960. 
 Particularly 
interesting is the South American content, where in 1960 around half of the countries applied a rule of 
automatic loss and in most other countries, there was no automatic loss but citizenship could also not 
be voluntarily renounced. By 2013, however, almost 90 percent of countries on the South American 
content applies the rule which is currently the most popular around the world, namely that there is no 
automatic loss, but individuals are allowed to renounce their citizenship, if they choose to do so 
(Figure 4). These changing rules clearly reflect a different approach towards dual citizenship and is 
normally linked to the desire of migration sending countries to maintain the links with the emigrant 
community (Jones-Correa 2001). 
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Source: Vink, De Groot and Luk (2013) 
Figure 5 summarizes the main trends and unequivocally shows the increasing acceptance of dual 
citizenship across the globe. Whereas in the early 1960s in more than 50% of states voluntary 
acquisition of another citizenship caused the automatic loss of citizenship of a state, in 2013 this has 
decreased to less than 35 percent. By contrast, we observe the opposite trend for states where no 
automatic loss occurs, but renunciation is possible: currently around 60 percent of states falls in this 
category. The percentage of states where loss does not occur and renunciation is not possible remains 
fairly stable around, or just below, the 10 percent.  
Do these dual citizenship rules matter? For that question we go back to the analysis by Vink, 
Prokic-Breuer and Dronkers (2013), who show that dual citizenship policies do matter. Immigrants 
who can retain their citizenship of origin are 40 percent more likely to acquire destination country 
citizenship. These results are controlled for individual factors such as gender, age, education and years 
of residence, as well as other origin countries (e.g. Human Development Index and whether 
immigrants come from former colonies or territories) and destination country features (GDP per capita 
and citizenship policy). However, there is no empirical support for the intuitive hypothesis that dual 
citizenship matters more for immigrants from highly developed countries than for those from less 
developed countries. The latter in general have a significantly higher propensity to naturalize, but this 
does not seem to be affected particularly by dual citizenship policies. 
6. Conclusions 
To conclude, immigrants coming from highly developed countries are not only less likely to 
naturalise, but whether or not they do so also seems to depend on few factors. If immigrants from 
highly developed countries naturalise at all, then years of residence play a crucial role in the process. 
For these immigrants, socio-economic and demographic features only play a marginal difference in 
their decision to naturalise, compared to the relevance of the time spent in the country of destination. 
In other words, not only does it matter where an immigrant is from, in terms of the propensity to 
naturalise, but it also matters significantly where an immigrant goes, in terms of the institutional 
context of the citizenship policy in the destination country. However, crucially, while destination 
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country citizenship policies clearly affect naturalisation rates among immigrants, their relevance is 
conditioned by the kind of origin country background of the immigrants involved. Hence, for the 
question of how much it matters where one goes, it matters significantly where one is from.  
The report raises two strands of issues, related to the actions and strategies of actors in origin 
countries, which could affect migrants’ integration in destination countries. 
First, dual citizenship policies, understood as the constellation of destination and origin country 
rules, affect the propensity to naturalise across the board, though within the context that the motivation 
to naturalise will depend also on other factors related to the socioeconomic background of the origin 
country, as well as individual level factors. From this perspective, the actors in the sending countries 
who can exercise the most direct relevance on the integration of migrations in destination countries, 
through the acquisition of citizenship, are the national legislators who regulate what happens upon the 
voluntary acquisition of another citizenship. The summary results of a worldwide survey presented in 
this report clearly demonstrate that these actors in origin countries increasingly often accept dual 
citizenship as a natural phenomenon in an increasingly transnational world and, thus, abandon 
previously restrictive rules. At the same time, even though by now a clear minority, there are still a 
significant number of states in the world where the phenomenon of dual citizenship is still actively 
countered through restrictive citizenship rules. In a survey among sending country legislators, but also 
diaspora interest groups, in a diversity of geographical, socioeconomic and legal context, these 
changing attitudes towards dual citizenship could be probed further.  
Second, following up on the previous point, the report highlights a major issue which has so far 
received relatively little attention, at least in the surveyed literature on citizenship acquisition and 
socioeconomic, political and sociocultural integration of migrants in destination countries. This relates 
to the under-researched issue of the relevance of retaining origin country citizenship for the relation 
between naturalisation and immigrant integration. In much of the, economically oriented, literature the 
default assumption seems to be one of assimilationism: what matters for integration is destination 
country citizenship, not origin country citizenship. However, apart from affecting the propensity to 
naturalise, dual citizenship rules in origin countries by definition also affect the continuing relation of 
the naturalised migration, after having acquired destination country citizenship. How does this 
contuining tie with the origin country, expressed in a legal status or not, affect the migrants’ 
integration in the destination country? Apart from the occasional case studies of specific destination 
and origin country constellations (e.g. between Mexico and the US, see Fitzgerald 2008), there is 
relatively limited systematic evidence on how origin country citizenship affects what is often seen as a 
‘citizenship premium’ in destination countries. Moreover, in a related manner, even if origin countries 
broadly accept dual citizenship through their citizenship legislation, a wide variety of diaspora politics 
is foreseeable, in terms of the efforts by government officials linked to diplomatic representation who 
may reach out to the emigrant community to either stimulate or discourage them to naturalise in the 
destination country. By keeping a formal link with the origin country, citizenship policy is often seen 
as an important tool to maintain the ties with the economically significant diaspora. Such politics may 
or may not interfere in the migrants’ integration process in the destination country. Hence, even if 
legislators broadly accept dual citizenship for pragmatic reasons of keeping the bond alive with the 
emigrant community, how do they view this continuing legal bond in terms of political, social and 
economic obligations, both of the sending country and the individual migrant? And, how do individual 
migrants view these continuing legal ties with the origin country?  
While the viewpoint that citizenship can serve as a tool for integration is increasingly accepted, in 
academia as well as in national politics, now that citizenship policies in origin countries become 
increasingly tolerant towards dual citizenship, in Europe and beyond, as demonstrated in this report, 
there is a self-evident relevance to further exploring how maintaining origin country citizenship 
interacts in the citizenship-integration nexus in the destination context. The role of relevant actors in 
sending countries, such as legislators and diaspora group representatives, will be crucial to understand 
how this interaction plays out, across various constellations of sending and destination countries. 
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